Título : | The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind | Tipo de documento: | texto impreso | Autores: | Brian P. McLaughlin, Editor científico ; Ansgar Beckermann, Editor científico ; Sven Walter, Editor científico | Editorial: | Londres : Clarendon | Fecha de publicación: | 2011 | Número de páginas: | 815 p | ISBN/ISSN/DL: | 978-0-19-959631-7 | Idioma : | Inglés (eng) | Clasificación: | [Palabras claves]COGNICIÓN [Palabras claves]CONCIENCIA [Palabras claves]FILOSOFÍA DE LA MENTE [Palabras claves]MENTE Y CUERPO [Palabras claves]NEUROCIENCIA
| Resumen: | The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind presents a guide on the philosophy of mind. The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. A leading international team of contributors offer forty-five critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency. | Nota de contenido: | Introduction Brian P. Mclaughlin
The Place of Mind in Nature
Mental CausationJaegwon Kim
The Causal Closure of the Physical and NaturalismDavid Papineau
DualismE. J. Lowe
EpiphenomenalismSven Walter
Anomalous MonismJulie Yoo
Non‐Reductive MaterialismLynne Rudder Baker
FunctionalismRobert Van Gulick
What is Property Physicalism?Ansgar Beckermann
What is the Physical?Barbara Montero
IdealismHoward Robinson
PanpsychismWilliam Seager
The Nature of Consciousness and the Place of Consciousness in Nature
SubjectivityJohn Perry
Higher‐Order Theories of ConsciousnessDavid M. Rosenthal
Representationalist Theories of ConsciousnessMichael Tye
Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational QualitiesAlex Byrne
The Explanatory GapJoseph Levine
Phenomenal ConceptsKatalin Balog
The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against MaterialismDavid J. Chalmers
Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content
Intentional Systems TheoryDaniel Dennett
Wide ContentFrances Egan
Narrow ContentGabriel Segal
Information‐Theoretic SemanticsFred Dretske
BiosemanticsRuth Garrett Millikan
A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional AttitudesRobert J. Matthews
The Normativity of the IntentionalRalph Wedgwood
Concepts and Possession ConditionsChristopher Peacocke
The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual ContentJosé Luis Bermúdez
IntentionalismTim Crane
The Content of Perceptual ExperienceMichelle Montague
Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the MindGeorge Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson
Self, Unity of Consciousness, and Personal Identity
The SelfGalen Strawson
Unity of ConsciousnessPaul Raymont and Andrew Brook
Personal Identity and MetaphysicsTamar Szabó Szabó Gendler
A Variety of Mental Abilities
ImaginationColin McGinn
ThinkingLouise Antony
Language and ThoughtJohn Heil
Consciousness and ReferenceJohn Campbell
MemoryKrista Lawlor
Emotions: Motivating FeelingsJesse Prinz
Intention and Intentional ActionAlfred R. Mele
Epistemic Issues
Folk PsychologyAdam Morton
Other MindsAnita Avramides
IntrospectionCynthia Macdonald
Semantic Externalism and Self‐KnowledgeJessica Brown
Self‐DeceptionKent Bach
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The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind [texto impreso] / Brian P. McLaughlin, Editor científico ; Ansgar Beckermann, Editor científico ; Sven Walter, Editor científico . - Londres : Clarendon, 2011 . - 815 p. ISBN : 978-0-19-959631-7 Idioma : Inglés ( eng) Clasificación: | [Palabras claves]COGNICIÓN [Palabras claves]CONCIENCIA [Palabras claves]FILOSOFÍA DE LA MENTE [Palabras claves]MENTE Y CUERPO [Palabras claves]NEUROCIENCIA
| Resumen: | The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind presents a guide on the philosophy of mind. The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. A leading international team of contributors offer forty-five critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency. | Nota de contenido: | Introduction Brian P. Mclaughlin
The Place of Mind in Nature
Mental CausationJaegwon Kim
The Causal Closure of the Physical and NaturalismDavid Papineau
DualismE. J. Lowe
EpiphenomenalismSven Walter
Anomalous MonismJulie Yoo
Non‐Reductive MaterialismLynne Rudder Baker
FunctionalismRobert Van Gulick
What is Property Physicalism?Ansgar Beckermann
What is the Physical?Barbara Montero
IdealismHoward Robinson
PanpsychismWilliam Seager
The Nature of Consciousness and the Place of Consciousness in Nature
SubjectivityJohn Perry
Higher‐Order Theories of ConsciousnessDavid M. Rosenthal
Representationalist Theories of ConsciousnessMichael Tye
Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational QualitiesAlex Byrne
The Explanatory GapJoseph Levine
Phenomenal ConceptsKatalin Balog
The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against MaterialismDavid J. Chalmers
Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content
Intentional Systems TheoryDaniel Dennett
Wide ContentFrances Egan
Narrow ContentGabriel Segal
Information‐Theoretic SemanticsFred Dretske
BiosemanticsRuth Garrett Millikan
A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional AttitudesRobert J. Matthews
The Normativity of the IntentionalRalph Wedgwood
Concepts and Possession ConditionsChristopher Peacocke
The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual ContentJosé Luis Bermúdez
IntentionalismTim Crane
The Content of Perceptual ExperienceMichelle Montague
Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the MindGeorge Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson
Self, Unity of Consciousness, and Personal Identity
The SelfGalen Strawson
Unity of ConsciousnessPaul Raymont and Andrew Brook
Personal Identity and MetaphysicsTamar Szabó Szabó Gendler
A Variety of Mental Abilities
ImaginationColin McGinn
ThinkingLouise Antony
Language and ThoughtJohn Heil
Consciousness and ReferenceJohn Campbell
MemoryKrista Lawlor
Emotions: Motivating FeelingsJesse Prinz
Intention and Intentional ActionAlfred R. Mele
Epistemic Issues
Folk PsychologyAdam Morton
Other MindsAnita Avramides
IntrospectionCynthia Macdonald
Semantic Externalism and Self‐KnowledgeJessica Brown
Self‐DeceptionKent Bach
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